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Abstract
Recent inflation experience in 
the EU shows that peripheral 
countries such as Greece, Por­
tugal or Ireland exhibit persis­
tent positive inflation differen­
tials with the rest of the Euro 
zone. For Greece and Portugal 
in particular, the situation calls 
for immediate attention for two 
reasons. First, both countries 
have a relative short record of 
price stability: they achieved 
inflation convergence during 
the second half of the 1990s, 
after following a successful 
exchange rate-based stabili­
zation programme. Second, 
both countries face large cur­
rent account deficits during a 
period when inflation differ­
entials further erode compet­
itiveness. The purpose of this 
paper is to evaluate the rele­
vance competing explanations 
of the inflation differentials 
of Greece and Portugal which 
are provided by the recent lit­
erature. Particular emphasis is 
given to the analysis of the in­
flationary impact of structural 
asymmetries, which are pres­
ent in these countries. In this 
context the importance of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect on 
inflation is evaluated. Finally, 
the paper discusses the results 
of the analysis and the policy 
implications of the conclusions 
reached.
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1. Introduction
To date, Economic and Monetary Union, has not shown 
the inflationary bias that many of its critics have predicted. 
Overall inflation performance in the Euro area has been sat­
isfactory; inflation has remained close to the 2 per cent level 
- the level which is compatible with the European Central 
Bank’s definition of price stability- despite the inflationary 
impact of the introduction of the Euro in its physical form. 
However, inflation divergence within the Euro area has been 
substantial, especially for certain peripheral countries. For 
example, during the 2001-2003 period, consumer price in­
flation was on average, as low as 1% in Germany and as high 
as 4,5% in Ireland and close to 4% in Portugal and Greece.
Inflation disparities within a monetary union are not 
necessarily harmful. On the contrary, they could reflect nec­
essary price adjustments that have to take place when asym­
metric shocks affect economic activity in various regions of 
the union. The higher inflation rate in Ireland, for example, 
is not surprising if someone considers the fact that the Irish 
economy was growing three to four times faster compared 
to the rest of the Euro area in the 2000-2002 period. On the 
other hand, persistent inflation differential could be prob­
lematic if it erodes the competitive position of a country 
member of the monetary union. This is because regaining 
previous levels of competitiveness could be costly, since it 
requires a (painful) downward adjustment of wages.
For such a reason, there is a growing concern about the 
recent inflation performance of Greece and Portugal (e.g. 
Bank of Greece (2003), OECD (2003), Ardy, et. al (2002)). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the sources of infla­
tion in these two peripheral countries of the EU and to dis­
cuss the policy implications that emanate from such an in­
vestigation. The analysis of the inflationary performance of 
Portugal and Greece is quite interesting for the following 
reasons: first, the two countries have a short history of price 
stability since they met the inflation convergence criteria 
during the second half of the 1990s. Second, both countries 
show significant structural weaknesses relative to the rest of 
the Euro area. Their economy is characterized by a low de­
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gree of openness, low level of relative productivity and thus 
weak trade competitiveness. With such economic struc­
ture, these countries face a different balance of cost and 
benefits of the monetary unification compared the rest of 
the EU area. Third, both countries currently face large cur­
rent account deficits; in Portugal the current account deficit 
peaked at 10% of GDP in 2000 and still remains high (about 
8% in 2002), while in Greece it remained above the 6% level 
since 2000. It is interesting, therefore, to examine to what 
extent inflation differentials with the rest of EU represent 
a threat to their international competitiveness. Finally, the 
analysis of the inflation experience of the two countries dur­
ing the first years of their EMU participation could provide 
useful policy conclusions for other member countries of 
the enlarged European Union with similar economic struc­
ture and inflation record, which will eventually apply for full 
EMU membership.
2. Inflation differentials within EMU: is there an expla­
nation?
Literature provides two distinct approaches to explaining 
inflation divergence in the EMU periphery. Explanations 
that fall into the first approach view inflation divergence as 
a temporary phenomenon which owes its existence either to 
necessary relative price adjustments or to specific economic 
policies adopted in relation to EMU participation. Accord­
ing to this line of explanation, high inflation in the EU pe­
ripheral countries is mainly due to one or more of the fol­
lowing: a) the Balassa-Samuelson effect, b) the tendency of 
authorities in small countries to opt for entry at a monetary 
union at undervalued exchange rate, and c) the monetary 
easing that could follow the restrictive policies adopted dur­
ing the convergence process.
The second approach to explaining inflation divergence 
emphasises the role of structural weaknesses and inefficien­
cies related to the functioning of specific markets in periph­
eral countries (i.e. labour markets and other key goods and 
services markets).
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As mentioned earlier, inflation divergence is expected 
within a monetary union because of the need to allow for 
relative price changes between the European countries. Bal- 
assa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) provided an attractive 
theoretical framework to explain inflation divergence and 
real exchange rate movements between advanced and less 
advanced economies. They suggest that relatively less ad­
vanced countries experience large productivity differential 
between the tradable and the non-tradable goods sectors of 
the economy. The tradable goods sector shows significant­
ly higher productivity growth compared to the non trad­
able goods sector; this is because the former is exposed to 
international competition while for the latter productivity 
growth is constrained by a low degree of competition and 
market inefficiencies domestically. In addition, the Balassa- 
Samuelson model rests on two key assumptions: a) labour 
markets are competitive and labour mobility ensures that 
wages in the traded and non traded goods sectors are equal; 
and b) the prices of tradable goods follow the Purchasing 
Power Parity condition.
Under the assumption of wage equalisation in all sectors, 
prices are expected to grow faster in the non-tradable goods 
sector (compared to tradable goods) because of its slower 
productivity growth. This leads into an increase in the rela­
tive price of non-traded goods and also to a higher CPI in­
flation for less advanced countries relative to the inflation 
of more advanced countries. In short, the so called Balas- 
sa-Samuelson effect suggests that less advanced economies 
will face higher inflation rates because they show large dif­
ferential in sectoral productivity growth.
The higher levels of inflation, in turn, result into appre­
ciation of the consumer price based real exchange rate when 
these economies participate in a monetary union (i.e. when 
they fix the nominal exchange rate).
If the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect is at work, then the 
appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate in a monetary 
union may be compatible with the maintenance of its trade 
competitiveness. The inflation differences that are linked to 
productivity growth differentials are characterised as equili­
brating adjustments within a monetary union (Furstenberg,
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2003), which fade out eventually; policy makers should not 
worry or take specific measures to reduce inflation differ­
ences.
A second explanation for inflation differentials within a 
monetary union is based on the fact that some countries 
choose to have an undervalued currency when they proceed 
into some kind of exchange rate pegging with other curren­
cies. For example, Furstenberg (2003) suggests that the in­
crease in inflation in Ireland at the beginning of the current 
decade can be partly attributed to its choice of policy to en­
ter the EMU at an undervalued exchange rate. Such policy 
was adopted in order to strengthen Ireland’s ongoing eco­
nomic growth and help the modernisation of its industry. 
Its inflationary impact is regarded as transitory since it is 
expected to fade out when higher inflation rates lead to a 
higher (equilibrium) real exchange rate.
Furthermore, IMF (1999) suggests that the tight mone­
tary and exchange rate policies adopted by some peripheral 
countries in order to achieve the Maastricht inflation con­
vergence criteria were followed by monetary easing when 
interest rates converged to EU levels. Such monetary eas­
ing would have significant inflationary effects, especially for 
Greece, which witnessed a sharp decline in interest rates 
within a short period (i.e. the short term interest rate fell 
from 14% in 1998 to 4.3 in 2001). The IMF, using a structural 
vector autoregression (VAR) model estimated that a pos­
sible monetary easing in Greece could contribute up to 1,5 
percentage points to average inflation. It is suggested that 
fiscal tightness is necessary to counterbalance the inflation­
ary effects of monetary easing.
Unlike the above views, those who explain inflation on 
the basis of the structural weaknesses of the peripheral 
countries suggest that the disinflationary effort should rely 
on necessary structural reforms that increase productivity 
growth. Such reforms should aim at enhancing competition 
resulting into lower prices in specific markets or industries 
and thus to lower inflation rate during the adjustment peri­
od. For example the Bank of Greece (2003) stresses the im­
portance of the deregulation and liberalisation of the energy 
goods markets and other key services markets (e.g. trans­
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portation, telecommunications). In labour markets, reform 
should aim at increasing the level of wage flexibility, since 
wage moderation is an important part of the adjustment 
process within a monetary union (EU Commission, 2002).
3. Explaining Inflation differentials in Portugal and 
Greece
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the inflation differentials 
in Greece and Portugal with respect to the Euro area, dur­
ing the 1990s. The disinflation process in the two countries 
shares some common features. Both countries showed dou­
ble digit inflation rates in the early 1990s. Anti-inflation pol­
icies adopted during the 1990s were in the context of the 
EMU related convergence effort. Exchange rate pegging was 
a crucial part of the stabilisation policies adopted in both 
countries: in Portugal currency pegging was formal because 
of its EMS participation (since 1992), while Greece followed 
the so called hard drachma policy, according to which the 
currency was allowed to depreciate relative to ECU by less 
than inflation differentials. The inflation convergence pe­
riod was somehow shorter for Portugal relative to Greece. 
Portugal met the Maastricht inflation convergence criteria 
during 1995-96, while Greece during 1999. However, the 
two countries experienced widening inflation differentials 
during the 2000-2002 period. Table 1 shows the evolution 
of HICP inflation in the two countries since 1997. Due to 
persistent inflation differentials, price levels in Greece and 
Portugal have grown about 8% more relative to the EU area, 
since 1998 (figure 2).
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Greece · - - Portugal
Figure 1. Inflation differentials with Euro Area for Greece and 
Portugal.
Source. EU Commission, European Economy, Statistical Annex.
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Figure 2. The evolution of the CPI in Euro Area, Greece and Por­
tugal.
Source. EU Commission, European Economy, Statistical Annex.
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Table 1. Price inflation indices for Greece, Portugal and the Euro 
area.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(Annual change, %)
Greece
Harmonized ICP 5.5 4.1 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.4
Goods (61%) 3.7 3.9 1.7 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.0
Food (19%) 4.1 4.4 2.4 1.9 5.1 5.3 4.8
Unprocessed food 11.0 7.0 2.4 1.7 6.7 6.9 6.4
Industrial goods (42%) 3.5 3.3 0.5 3.6 2.0 1.8 1.9
Services (39%) 8.4 6.2 4.0 2.8 3.7 4.5 4.1
Wholesale price Index 3.5 3.8 1.8 6.6 2.3 2.4 2.1
Imported final goods 2.3 5.4 0.6 6.4 1.9 0.4 1.1
Portugal 
Harmonized ICP 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.8 4.4 3.7 3.3
Goods (69%) 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.2 4.2 2.4 2.7
Food (26%) 0.4 4.0 2.7 1.9 6.1 1.9 2.9
Unprocessed food -0.7 6.1 2.7 2.5 8.8 0.3 2.6
Industrial goods (43%) 1.6 0.6 1.0 2.4 3.1 2.7 2.6
Services (31%) 4.0 3.7 3.3 4.2 4.8 6.0 4.5
Producer price index 2.3 0.9 1.0 3.2 1.9 2.0 n.a.
Imported final goods -0.5 1.1 0.3 1.8 2.8 -0.9 -1.4
Euro area
Harmonized ICP 1.6 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.1
Goods 1.2 0.6 0.8 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.8
Food 1.4 1.6 0.6 1.4 4.4 3.1 2.8
Unprocessed food 1.4 2.0 0.0 1.8 7.0 3.1 2.2
Industrial goods 1.1 0.1 1.0 3.4 1.5 1.0 1.2
Services 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.7 3.1 2.5
Sources. Bank of Greece, Banco de Portugal and ECB.
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Inflation and the real exchange rate.
The exchange rate based stabilisation policies followed by 
Greece and Portugal resulted into a real appreciation of the 
domestic currency. In Portugal, real appreciation was par­
ticularly strong during the early 1990s. The escudo remained 
overvalued in real terms, despite its 1992-93 devaluations 
in the EMS (Detragiache and Hamann, 1997). Similarly, the 
1998 corrective devaluation of the drachma was not enough 
to offset the real appreciation caused by the ‘hard drachma’ 
policy in the preceding period (IMF, (2003c)).
Table 2 shows the evolution of the real effective exchange 
rate of Greece, Portugal and Ireland vis a vis a) the major in­
dustrialised countries, and b) the Euro area. The real effective 
exchange rate is measured on the basis of consumer prices 
and unit labour costs in total economy and in manufactur­
ing. All the measurements of the real effective exchange rate 
in table 2 suggest that the escudo was rather overvalued in 
real terms at the time that EMU was lounged. The degree of 
its real appreciation in the 1990-98 period was in the range 
of 15-30%, depending on the measurement used. In addi­
tion, the real effective exchange rate has followed a moder­
ate appreciating trend since 1999. Similarly, the real effec­
tive exchange rate of Greece vis a vis the Euro area has ap­
preciated by 5 to 10%, depending on the measurement, since 
the mid 1990s. The strong dollar of the 1999-2001 period, 
however, prevented the appreciation of Greece’s overall real 
effective exchange rate.
On the contrary, Ireland experienced a considerable real 
exchange rate devaluation especially when the real exchange 
rate is measured on the basis of relative unit labour costs vis 
a vis the Euro area. Thus, inflation in Ireland can be largely 
attributed to the improvement of the price competitiveness 
and increased export demand. However, the real exchange 
rate developments in Greece and Portugal worked as defla­
tionary force in their economies. They contributed to the 
deterioration of the relative competitive position of each 
country leading to lower export demand and to the widen­
ing of the current account deficit (IMF, 2003b).
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Table 2. Competitiveness indicators (real effective exchange rate 
index, 1995=100).
1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Greece
vs. rest of 24 industrialized countries
consumer prices 90.2 103.9 104.5 101.0 101.4 95.7 96.7 99.0
ULC, total economy 95.0 102.3 107.7 106.7 105.2 98.2 97.5 99.1
ULC, manufacturing 100.9 101.3 108.6 101.6 108.2 101.3 100.3 101.2
vs. the rest of the Euro area
consumer prices 91.5 103.9 107.8 104.4 106.5 104.0 103.3 104.6
ULC, total economy 97.1 102.5 112.1 111.7 112.8 109.4 106.6 107.0
ULC, manufacturing 102.3 101.1 113.0 106.8 115.1 112.3 109.4 110.0
Portugal
vs. rest of 24 industrialized countries
consumer prices 87.5 101.8 100.0 100.1 99.7 97.6 100.0 102.4
ULC, total economy 80.9 103.3 103.3 103.0 108.4 107.8 110.5 114.7
ULC, manufacturing 78.6 98.7 95.6 94.7 94.1 93.4 94.3 97.7
vs. the rest of the Euro area
consumer prices 89.1 102.0 103.6 104.0 105.0 105.6 107.3 108.7
ULC, total economy 83.2 103.7 107.8 108.4 115.9 119.2 121.6 124.9
ULC, manufacturing 80.5 98.8 99.7 99.8 99.9 102.4 103.0 105.8
Ireland
vs. rest of 24 industrialized countries
consumer prices 107.0 102.8 105.2 102.5 101.2 97.5 100.7 105.7
ULC, total economy 106.4 100.3 100.1 98.1 93.8 89.8 93.9 96.0
ULC, manufacturing 137.1 100.6 97.0 86.9 82.3 75.5 73.7 74.6
vs. the rest of the Euro area
consumer prices 111.1 103.1 112.5 110.0 111.3 113.4 115.4 118.2
ULC, total economy 111.4 100.7 108.0 107.4 105.7 108.1 111.9 111.5
ULC, manufacturing 143.2 100.6 104.6 95.3 91.4 89.3 86.4 85.4
Source: EU Commission, Price and Cost competitiveness, 2n<1 quarter, 2003, ECFIN/ 
161.
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Inflation and the Balassa Samuelson effect
The key question that arises at this point is to what extent 
the BS effect is responsible for the higher inflation rates at 
the EMU periphery. The answer can give valuable insights 
on the policy response to higher inflation. If inflation differ­
ences are due to such an effect, there is no need for correc­
tive action in Ireland, Portugal or Greece. Empirical studies 
on the validity of the model have provided mixed results. 
Rogoff (1996) supports that there is strong evidence in fa­
vour of the BS hypothesis especially in explaining inflation 
differentials between very poor and very rich countries. 
Sinn and Reuter (2001) find considerable BS effects in the 
Euro area and suggest that the European Central Bank has 
to allow for a higher inflation rate target to accommodate 
inflation differentials if deflation for countries such as Ger­
many is to be avoided. Canzoneri et. al (1996) test the em­
pirical validity of the two key assumptions of the BS hypoth­
esis, i.e. that a) relative prices of traded goods domestically 
depend on relative productivities, and b) PPP holds for the 
traded goods internationally. Their findings give support to 
the validity of the first assumption, and they strongly reject 
the validity of the second one. In particular, they found large 
and long-lived deviations from PPP in traded goods when 
they examined the US dollar exchange rates vis a vis other 
major currencies.
Canzoneri et al (1998), however, provide evidence in fa­
vour of the BS hypothesis by showing that real exchange rate 
changes within a group of EU countries1 are mainly attrib­
uted to differences in the growth rates of the relative pric­
es of non-traded goods rather than deviations from PPP in 
the traded goods sector. They claim that "... rapid increas­
es in relative prices of home goods in southern European 
countries and Belgium are largely due to productivity gains 
in their traded sectors, and fundamentally should not be a 
cause for concern”. On the other hand, studies by Strauss 
(1998) and Faria and Leon-Ledesma (2000) reject the BS hy­
pothesis when they examine time series data for major in­
dustrialized countries.
1. The EU countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, G. Britain, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Spain.
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An IMF (2002) report identifies some problems regard­
ing the methodology employed in the empirical studies of 
the BS model. It is stressed that these studies overestimate 
the impact of the BS effect on inflation differentials because 
of three reasons: a) productivity in the traded goods sec­
tor may grow faster because of rising capital-labour ratios. 
Thus, it is not surprising that labour productivity increases 
and unit labour costs fall sharply in the sector. However, to­
tal costs per unit and therefore prices may diverge less com­
pared to other sectors than unit labour costs alone would 
suggest, b) The domestic non traded goods sectors provide 
substantial inputs to the tradables sector. Thus the value 
added deflator in the tradables sector, used by many studies, 
may not be a valid measure of the price level of tradables, c) 
Different sector productivity could be due to differences in 
the composition of labour. For example, services, which are 
included in the non tradables, may use more of low-skill or 
part-time employment and this might reflect to lower wages 
relative to other sectors. Then low productivity might not 
be translated into higher unit labour costs and changes in 
relative prices.
The contribution of the BS effect towards explaining the 
inflation differential of Greece and Portugal from the EU av­
erage is questionable. Empirical studies give different esti­
mates on the size of the effect. Sinn and Reuter (2001), using 
data from the 1987-95 period, estimate that a 3% annual in­
flation rate differential can be attributed to the BS effect for 
Greece; in the case of Portugal, however, they do not show a 
significant impact of the BS effect on inflation. IMF (1999), 
using data from the 1960-96 period, estimated that the con­
tribution of the BS effect on inflation amounts to 1% level 
for Greece and 2,5% for Portugal.
However, as already mentioned, such studies tend to 
overestimate the inflationary impact of the BS effect. IMF 
(2002) gave a different estimate of the effect when used the 
HICP proxy as a basis for measurement and data from the 
1995-2001 period: the BS effect was found responsible for 
an inflation rate of 0.7% in both countries. The HICP proxy 
was calculated by assuming that the trend differential be­
tween industrial goods (representing tradables) and ser­
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vices (representing non tradables) in each country’s HICP 
remains constant going forward. This measurement relies 
directly on the observed inflation differential and seems to 
be immune to the problems discussed above, which appear 
when productivity differentials and value added deflators 
are used.
However, even such moderate estimates of the BS effect 
could be an overestimation of the true effect for two reasons 
mainly. First, as convergence in peripheral countries moves 
on sectoral productivity differentials diminish. Thus, using 
past period data to estimate the BS effect lead to an overesti­
mation of such effect. Table 3 shows recent developments in 
labour productivity and unit labour costs in various sectors 
of the economy of Greece and Portugal. In Greece, labour 
productivity growth in manufacturing (a tradable goods 
sector) was lower compared to that in the whole business 
sector for each year since 1997, with the exception of 1998. 
During the same period, the growth of unit labour costs in 
manufacturing and in total economy followed similar path 
for both Greece and Portugal. These data do not support 
the hypothesis of higher productivity growth in the tradable 
goods sector for recent years.
Second, due to lack of data, empirical studies use da­
ta from the manufacturing sector as proxy for measuring 
conditions in the tradables sector, and services sector da­
ta as proxy for the non tradables sector. Such classification, 
however, is crude and subjective. Treating services as non 
tradables can be misleading, especially for countries such 
as Greece and Portugal. The value of services exports for 
Greece is double the value of commodity exports in recent 
years. In Portugal, services exports are almost 40% of com­
modity exports. Where tourism and immigration are signif­
icant, a large proportion of GDP is actually tradable goods 
and services.2 Furthermore, market liberalisation, deregula­
tion and IT increase the proportion of tradables over time.
2. It should be noted that tradable goods and services are different from trad­
ed ones. Tradables are goods and services that are either internationally 
traded or ‘... could be traded at some plausible range of variation in relative 
prices.4 (Goldstein and Officer 1979, p.415)
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Table 3. Labour statistics (annual percentage changes).
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Greece
Labour productivity1
business sector 4.8 -0.9 4.0 4.9 4.9 3.7 2.0
manufacturing, product per hour worked 4.4 4.4 1.9 3.2 2.5 1.6 2.2
Wages1
total economy, nominal 10.5 6.3 4.5 6.5 5.2 7.2 5.5
total economy, real 4.7 1.4 1.9 3.2 1.7 3.5 1.9
business sector1 11.3 4.7 4.2 5.5 5.2 6.8 5.7
Manufacturing (hourly wages) 8.9 4.7 4.4 5.5 5.5 6.4 5.9
Public sector 13.5 9.2 3.5 7.1 5.5 7.3 5.8
Public enterprises 11.0 5.7 5.1 13.7 8.2 11.2 7.0
Unit Labour cost1
total economy 6.9 4.2 2.8 3.4 3.6 4.7 3.3
business sector 5.6 3.3 2.7 3.1 4.2 4.0 3.4
Manufacturing 4.4 0.2 3.8 3.7 2.9 4.2 3.6
Portugal
Labour productivity
total economy2 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 0.3 0.4 -0.5
business sector2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.7
Wages
total economy, nominal2 5.6 5.3 5.4 6.6 5.5 5.6 3.0
total economy, real2 3.6 2.6 3.2 3.0 1.6 1.7 -0.3
corporate sector, nominal2 5.4 5.0 4.5 5.3 6.3 5.6 3.4
corporate sector, real2 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.7 -0.4
Manufacturing 1^ 4.8 4.8 4.5 5.1 5.4 4.6 n.a.
Unit Labour cost
total economy2 3.2 4.2 3.3 4.0 5.5 5.2 3.5
Manufacturing^ 2.1 2.8 3.9 2.3 4.3 4.3 n.a.
Euro area 
Labour productivity
total economy5 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.2 1.1 0.4
business sector2 1.7 0.9 0.7 1.3 -0.1 0.4 0.4
Wages
total economy, nominal5 2.0 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.6
total economy, real5 0.0 -0.1 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6
business sector, nominal5 1.7 0.8 1.2 2.3 2.6 2.7 n.a.
corporate sector, real 0.1 -0.3 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 n.a.
Unit Labour cost
total economy5 0.5 0.2 1.1 1.0 2.4 1.8 1.9
business sector2 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.3 2.7 2.3 1.3
Sources. 1. Bank of Greece, Annual Report of the Governor, 2004. 2. Banco de Portu­
gal, Economic Bulletin. 3. OECD, Economic Outlook, 2003. 4. IMF Country Reports 
for Greece and Portugal. 5. EU Commission.
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Thus an increasing proportion of financial services, busi­
ness services, transportation, and wholesale and retail ser­
vices can be characterised as tradables. McDonald and Ricci 
(2001), for example, examine the impact of productivity of 
the distribution sector (which is usually included in the non 
tradables sector), on relative prices and the real exchange 
rate. They find that an increase in distribution sector pro­
ductivity at home relative to the foreign countries leads to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, similarly to what 
an increase in the productivity of domestic tradables does. 
They suggest that a possible explanation for such a result 
may be related to the fact that the tradable sector uses ex­
tensively services from the distribution sector.
In short, studies which regard services as non tradables 
overestimate the share of non tradables in total value add­
ed and thus result into an overestimation of the inflationary 
impact of the BS effect. Hence, given the recent empirical 
work and considering the above discussion, one can con­
clude that the contribution of the BS effect to recent infla­
tion in Greece and Portugal is very small if not negligible.
Inflation and monetary conditions.
The combination of interest rate convergence with higher 
inflation rates relative to the EU area has resulted into low 
real interest rates in Greece and Portugal. Low real inter­
est rates and financial liberalisation have resulted to a rapid 
expansion of the bank credit provided to the private sector, 
and especially to households. Table 4 provides a descrip­
tion of the monetary conditions in both countries during 
the 1997-2002 period. In Greece, real short term interest 
rates fell from an average of 7% in 1999 to 1.1% in 2001. 
Low interest rates and the liberalisation of consumer credit 
resulted in significant credit expansion in the 2000-02 pe­
riod. In Portugal, real interest rates have been particularly 
low since 1998. Total credit to private sector grew at an an­
nual rate which exceeded the 20% level in the 1997-2000 
period. Fast credit expansion boosted consumer and in­
vestment demand intensifying inflationary pressures in the 
economy. The evolution of the output gap (table 4) confirms 
the increased pressure from aggregate demand during the
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Table 4. Monetary conditions in Greece and Portugal.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Greece
Contribution to euro area M3*1 7.8 9.8 5.6 17.1 7.4 -1.8 n.a.
Domestic credit to the private sector*1 11.0 9.7 12.2 27.6 24.8 16.9 17.0
Real short term interest rate (%)2 6.0 8.2 7.1 4.3 1.1 0.1 -1.3
Real long term interest rate (%)2 n.a. 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.8 0.7
Output gap -2.1 -2.9 -2.3 -1.1 0.1 0.4 0.9
Portugal
Contribution to euro area M3*1 6.3 7.8 9.8 6.9 5.8 3.3 n.a.
Domestic credit to the private sector*1 20.7 25.0 26.2 23.9 12.2 7.3 n.a.
Real short term interest rate (%)2 2.7 0.4 -0.3 1.4 -0.5 0.2 -0.1
Real long term interest rate (%)2 2.5 1.1 1.4 2.5 0.4 1.8 1.8
Output gap3 0.7 2.0 2.4 2.6 1.1 -1.3 -3.6
Euro Area
M3*2 4.0 5.1 5.6 4.3 . 7.7 6.8 7.0
Real short term interest rate (%) 3.1 2.8 2.1 3.3 2.1 1.4 0.3
Real long term interest rate (%) 4.2 2.9 3.2 3.9 2.5 2.9 2.0
Output gap -1.9 -1.2 -0.6 0.7 0.0 -1.3 -2.0
‘Annual percentage changes.
Notes and Sources: 1. IMF Country Reports 2. EU Commission, European Economy, 
Statistical Annex. (Real rates are calculated with GDP deflator) 3. OECD definition; 
OECD Economic Outlook.
2000-02 period in Greece, and during the 1998-2000 period 
in Portugal. Therefore, low interest rates have increased in­
flationary pressure for given periods in the two countries. 
However, since 2001, money supply growth in both coun­
tries has significantly slowed down relative to the rest of the 
Euro area. Monetary authorities suggested that money sup­
ply restrain and the considerable real exchange rate appre­
ciation that took place during the same period largely off­
set the inflationary pressures emanating from rapid credit 
expansion.3 In addition, in Portugal, there has been a con­
siderable easing of aggregate demand pressure since 2000. 
Therefore, one can conclude that monetary conditions dur­
ing the last two years cannot explain the sizeable inflation 
differentials in the two countries.
3. See, for example, Bank of Greece (2003), p. 153 and IMF (2003a) p. 9.
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Table 5. Labour and product market comparison: Greece, Portu­
gal and the EU (2002).
Greece Portugal EU-15
Labour productivity1 84.6 65.1 100
Employment rate* 55.4 68.8 64.0
Unemployment rate 9.9 4.6 7.6
Relative price levels2 81.0 74.0 100
Total trade to GDP*3 16.5 28.1 45.6
FDI share (% GDP)’ 1.3 5.4 4.5
Cross border M&A share*4 0.6 0.9 100
R&D expenditure (% GDP)***1 0.67 0.76 1.93
Internet access at home (%) 9.2 30.8 40.4
Patent applications*5 7.7 5.5 161.1
Telecom prices (cost of national call)6 0.77 1.15 0.82
Market share fixed telecom 100% 100% -
Electricity prices for households7 5.80 12.23 10.33
*2001. *‘2000.
Source: EU Commission, 'Report on the implementation of the 2002 broad economic 
policy guidelines!
Notes: 1. Per person, in PPP, EU15=100. 2. EU15=100, private final consumption. 3. 
(Exports + Imports) / (2 *GDP). 4. Percentage of EU total. 5. Per million inhabitants. 
6. Price in Euro of a 10 minute call at 11.00 on a weekday (incl. VAT). 7. Price in Euro 
per kWh.
Inflation and economic structure
Table 5 presents key indicators of labour and product mar­
kets for Greece and Portugal relative to the EU. An exam­
ination of the data shows that the labour productivity is 
quite low, especially in Portugal (65% of the EU average). 
On the other hand, Portugal shows a high employment rate 
while Greece has the lowest employment rate in EU. Both 
countries have experienced fast economic growth in re­
cent years.4 However, unlike the case of Ireland, there has 
been little progress towards gaining productivity and com­
petitiveness. In Portugal, growth has relied on the increas­
ing use of capital and labour. IMF (2003) indicates the small 
contribution of technological progress in the Portuguese 
economy. In Greece, recent growth was caused by consid­
4. In Portugal economic growth was high during 1996-2000 period while
slowed down afterwards; Greece has experienced high growth rates since
1997.
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erable inward immigration and increased consumption and 
investment (mainly in the form of construction) due to low 
interest rates (Bank of Greece, 2003). As in Portugal, inno­
vation and technological progress has been limited. Table 
5 gives an indication of the technological deficit of the two 
countries: R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP in both 
countries is a fraction of the EU average; innovation as in­
dicated by the amount of patent applications is also limited; 
finally, IT use and IT related skills are below the EU aver­
age. Furthermore, the small size of inward FDI and limited 
cross border M&A activity (see table 5) do not make a sig­
nificant contribution to technological progress. Given the 
low level of technology, domestic production is dominated 
by low skill, labour intensive activities. In such a production 
environment, costs and product prices are heavily driven by 
wage developments.
Indeed, as table 3 shows, recent inflation in the two coun­
tries is related to significant wage inflation and the conse­
quent growth of the unit labour costs. Low labour market 
flexibility and labour mobility5 result into poor job matching 
and therefore to efficiency and productivity loss (IMF, 2002 
and 2003a). Given that money wages in the two countries 
are the lowest in EU there is pressure from labour unions for 
the faster convergence of domestic wages to the EU average. 
Indeed, where union power is strong, wage growth has been 
fast. In Greece, for example, wages in the public sector and 
in public enterprises during the 1997-2002 period grew at 
an average annual rate of 7.7% and 9.2% respectively; at the 
same time the annual wage growth rate in the business sec­
tor was 6.1% on average (table 3). Wages in the two coun­
tries are largely determined by collective bargaining, with 
the bargaining process showing a moderate degree of coor­
dination. Thus, trade unions have significant bargain power 
but no strong incentive to take the macroeconomic effect 
of wage increases into account (Ardy et al., 2002). In such 
wage setting environment, the emergence of social con­
tracts, binding wage developments to maintaining high lev­
els of employment and competitiveness, is quite unlikely.
5. Poor labour market conditions are largely determined by employment 
protection laws.
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Furthermore, there is an increasing amount of evidence 
suggesting that inflation in the two countries is largely af­
fected by the poor functioning of key markets for goods 
and services. Oligopolistic structure in many markets leads 
to price fixing behaviour and other practices which violate 
competition laws. On the other hand, weak institutional ar­
rangements do not allow the implementation of an effec­
tive competition policy. Thus, in markets where oligopolis­
tic power is strong increasing profit margins may result into 
increasing prices. In Greece, for example, the rapid growth 
of processed food prices (see table 1) since 2001, has been 
fuelled by rising profit margins in the food sector as well as 
in the retail sector (see Bank of Greece, 2003).
According to table 1, the CPI inflation for services in both 
countries has been higher compared to the goods inflation 
in recent years, pushing overall inflation rate upwards. The 
monetary authorities in the two countries suggest that high­
er inflation rates in services, such as restaurant, hotel, repair 
and maintenance services etc. are due to the limited degree 
of market competition. Banco de Portugal insists that ‘... in­
flation in services, on one hand, reflects the high growth of 
wage costs in Portugal, on the other hand, indicates the ex­
istence of market structures not very competitive in some 
subsectors of services, which has permitted the widening of 
profit margins, in spite of a context of marked economic de­
celeration’ (Banco de Portugal, 2003, p. 36). Bank of Greece 
(2003) suggests that, although a large number of firms op­
erate in such markets, competition is limited by insufficient 
flow of information to consumers.
Another factor which explains poor competition in key 
markets is the limited progress achieved by the two coun­
tries in the areas of the privatisation of public enterprises 
and the deregulation and liberalisation of key markets for 
goods and services. For example, the process of the liberali­
sation of the fixed telecommunication and electricity sec­
tors, which initiated during 2001-02, has been slower rela­
tive to other EU countries. Also, the transportation sector 
is still heavily regulated and protected, especially domestic 
land and ferry transportation (EU Commission, 2003). In 
such market environment there is no pressure for rational­
izing production and increasing cost efficiency. Table 5, for
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example, shows that the telecom and electricity prices in 
Portugal are particularly high compared to the EU average 
(given that the country’s relative price level is only 74% of 
the EU), reflecting the considerable market power of pro­
ducers. This situation can be contrasted with the effects of 
recent liberalisation of the telecom market in Greece: the 
prices of telecom services fell by 2% in 2001 and 7.2% in 
2002 due to intensified market competition6.
4. Conclusion
The evaluation of competing explanations of inflation diver­
gence in Greece and Portugal has shown that market struc­
ture in the two countries constitutes the main source of in­
flation. Low labour market flexibility preserves wage infla­
tion leading to higher unit labour costs and thus to price in­
flation. In addition, weak competition in a number of mar­
kets for goods and services allows ologopolistic pricing and 
prevents the moderation of inflation. On the other hand, the 
Balassa - Samuelson hypothesis cannot provide a convinc­
ing answer to the observed persistent inflation differentials. 
The prevailing monetary and exchange rate conditions can 
not either. Thus, the view which relates inflation divergence 
either to relative price adjustments or to EMU related poli­
cies is not supported by the analysis presented here. In or­
der to ensure inflation convergence, Greece and Portugal 
have to adopt policies capable of increasing labour market 
flexibility and improving market structure domestically.
6. See Bank of Greece, (2003), p. 152.
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